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ABSTRACT 
 
LAUREN TUCKER: The End of the Wehrpflicht: An Exploration of Germany’s Delayed 
Embrace of an All-Volunteer Force 
(Under the direction of Liesbet Hooghe) 
 
 Conscription in Germany has shown an incredible resilience over the past two 
decades in the midst of a Europe-wide trend toward all-volunteer forces.  The politics of 
base closures, military recruitment concerns, and the dependence of the social service 
sector on the labor of conscientious objectors blocked the Bundeswehr from undergoing 
comprehensive structural reform.  In a recent development, Germany abandoned its 
Sonderweg in 2010 with very little debate, deciding to suspend conscription and 
transition to a professional force.  The rapid success of the policy change is a 
consequence of three developing factors: a financial environment of extreme austerity, 
the growing inequity of the draft, and former Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu 
Guttenberg’s immense popularity. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 German Chancellor Angela Merkel and former Minister of Defense Karl-Theodor 
zu Guttenberg announced in a joint press conference on November 22, 2010 that effective 
as of July 1, 2011, the government would suspend general conscription, known as the 
Wehrpflicht.  The institution of conscription has been a part of Bundeswehr culture since 
1956, necessitated by West Germany’s geopolitical position in the heart of the Cold War 
battlefield.  As the frontier to non-communist Europe, West Germany served as NATO’s 
first line of defense against a Soviet invasion of the continent, requiring the state to 
develop the capacity to amass large troop volumes for territorial defense.  Developments 
over the past two decades have created a starkly different international security 
environment, which increasingly calls the raison d'être of a large conscription army into 
question.  The Iron Curtain has fallen, Germany is reunited and surrounded by NATO 
allies, European integration has broken down territorial borders, and Russia is seen as a 
potential strategic partner rather than an existential threat.  Simultaneously new threats 
have emerged which are complex and transnational in nature and require the application 
of a more flexible and mobile force.  Quality and interoperability have usurped quantity 
and territoriality as the guiding principles around which security strategies are built.  In 
this external setting, Germany had until recent developments refused to abandon 
  2 
conscription and remained one of only four NATO member states yet to adopt an all-
volunteer, professional army.   
 The transformation of the Wehrpflicht in the political debate from an issue of 
national identity to an outdated policy that could no longer be reconciled with modern 
security needs has followed a rapid course over the past year.  This thesis aims to provide 
a general understanding of the trajectory of conscription in Germany since 1990 by 
answering two questions.  First, what were the primary factors behind the Wehrpflicht’s 
resilience over the past two decades, despite strong strategic pressures to reform and a 
general European trend toward all-volunteer forces?  Second, how can the recently 
emerging political consensus around transformational reform and the suspension of 
conscription best be explained?  
 The explanation that follows is divided into four main chapters.  Chapter 2 
provides the background information to the story: a historical overview of the 
Wehrpflicht in Germany from its inception to its recent suspension and the European 
comparative context.  Chapter 3 presents the key arguments on both sides of the 
Wehrpflicht debate as found in the existing literature.  Chapter 4 identifies the three 
primary factors behind Germany’s reluctance to abandon conscription over the past two 
decades: the domestic politics of base closures, military recruitment concerns, and the 
dependence of the social service sector on the labor of conscientious objectors.  Finally, 
Chapter 5 offers three interlocking explanations for the reform’s success: a financial 
environment of extreme austerity, the growing inequity of the draft, and zu Guttenberg’s 
immense popularity. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
 
 As a starting point for understanding the difficult debate in Germany around the 
Wehrpflicht and the transformation of the Bundeswehr into an all-volunteer force, this 
chapter will provide a historical overview of conscription, from its inception to its recent 
suspension.  It will also provide a European comparative context for the last two decades 
of reform. 
 
Historical Overview of the Wehrpflicht 
 Christian-democratic politicians initially denounced zu Guttenberg’s plan to 
suspend conscription as an affront to the identity of their party, the armed forces, and 
German democracy (Demmer, Kullmann, Pfister, & Schwennicke, 2010; “Kritik auf 
breiter Front,” 2010).  These emotional appeals implied that the Wehrpflicht was an 
immutable principle that should not be subjected to shifts in strategic calculus.  However, 
a look at the historical development of conscription discredits this narrative.  Since its 
inception, the Wehrpflicht had continually evolved to meet changing political and 
security imperatives (Grajetzki, 2010, p. 62; Longhurst, 2004, p. 120).   
 The conflation of the Wehrpflicht with the identity of the Bundeswehr does have a 
historical basis, as general conscription developed simultaneously with the reconstitution 
of the armed forces in the Federal Republic.  However, conscription did not enjoy 
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political consensus at the time, nor has it achieved it since.  With the advent of the 
Korean War and growing fears of Soviet expansion, the Western Allies abandoned the 
project of German demilitarization, allowing the Federal Republic to join NATO in 1955 
and rebuild its armed forces to a strength of 500,000 (Buch, 2010a, p. 35).  The Christian-
democratic government of Konrad Adenauer (CDU) insisted that reinstituting the 
Wehrpflicht was the only viable means to fill the ranks, while the opposition Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) argued that doing so would provoke a similar response in the 
“Soviet occupation zone” and deepen the division of Germany.  Following sixteen hours 
of debate, the German parliament passed the Wehrpflicht law on July 7, 1956, which 
obliged German men from the age of 18 to perform basic military service.  Conscripts 
began to serve for a period of 12 months in 1957 (Westdeutscher Rundfunk, 2006).  As 
predicted by the SPD, the German Democratic Republic responded by introducing a basic 
military service of 18 months in 1962 (Bundeswehr, 2011). 
 During the course of the bipolar conflict, the Federal Republic’s conscription 
policy did not remain static, but rather adapted to social, political, and security 
developments (Longhurst, 2004, p. 120).  In 1961, an alternative service or Zivildienst 
was introduced for conscientious objectors (BMFSFJ, 2008).  In 1968, the Basic Law was 
amended to reflect the obligation to perform basic military or an alternative service (GG 
§12a).  However, the terms of this service remained at the discretion of politicians.  As 
Table 1 on the next page shows, the length of the Wehrpflicht fluctuated over time, 
corresponding to shifts in political calculus. 
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Table 1 
Timeline of length of basic military service in Germany 
Time Period Length of Basic Service 
April 1, 1957 – March 31, 1962 12 months 
April 1, 1962 – June 30, 1962 15 months 
July 1, 1962 – December 31, 1972 18 months 
January 1, 1973 – September 30, 1990 15 months 
October 1, 1990 – December 31, 1995 12 months 
January 1, 1996 – December 31, 2001 10 months 
January 1, 2002 – November 30, 2010 9 months 
December 1, 2010 – June 30, 2011 6 months 
July 1, 2011 suspended 
Note. Data retrieved from www.bundeswehr.de. Dates before 1990 reflect service times in Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
 
 The initial service requirement of 12 months was increased to 18 months over the 
course of 1962 in response to President Kennedy’s demands for Bonn to increase its 
defense capabilities following the Berlin crisis (Kennedy, 1961; “Mobil-Machung,” 
1961).  A decade later, the signing of the Basic Treaty, in which the partitioned German 
states recognized one another for the first time, ushered in a period of Ostpolitik.  The 
relaxed security environment, combined with political concerns over growing draft 
inequity as a consequence of the coming-of-age of the large “Baby Boomer” generation, 
led to a reduction in service time to 15 months (Grajetzki, 2010, p. 62; “Wir werden nie 
genug,” 1972).  As the Bundeswehr’s recruitment pool began to run dry in the mid-1980s, 
a reflection of the demographic impact of the birth control pill, the government planned 
to reinstate the 18-month service term from the year 1989 (“Letztes Aufgebot,” 1984).  
However, the end of the Cold War precluded this policy change from taking effect 
(Longhurst, 2004, p. 120).  Instead, the Wehrpflicht was further reduced to 12 months 
with reunification in 1990, and has since been progressively pared down as part of an 
extended transformation process with the aim of modernizing the armed forces to better 
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meet the demands of the post-Cold War era (Grajetzki, 2010, pp. 63-65).  The policy 
debate unleashed by this transformation has centered around a growing tension between 
two previously harmonious principles of Bundeswehr identity: a severely limited use of 
force and multilateralism (Belkin, 2007; Malici, 2006; Maull, 2000; Meiers, 2007).  In 
many ways, conscription has become a symbol for this identity crisis, alternately seen as 
an obstacle to ‘normalization’ by its detractors or a safeguard against historical 
tendencies by its supporters (Longhurst, 2006). 
 Structured around the principle of territorial defense, the Bundeswehr exited the 
Cold War as a large and immobile force.  In a sense, it was never meant to fight.  The 
Allied policy of deterrence required warm bodies to line up along the Iron Curtain, not 
warriors. German society accepted remilitarization begrudgingly, and then only as a 
necessary means to maintain peace (Hoffmann & Longhurst, 1999, p. 148) .  NATO 
demands and the historically grounded aversion to force as a legitimate security tool were 
thus easily reconciled.  However, the end of the bipolar freeze challenged the dual 
principles of military restraint and multilateralism.  As new security threats emerged and 
conflicts erupted outside of Alliance borders, Allied partners increasingly questioned 
Germany’s historical pass from participating meaningfully in out-of-area missions 
(Hoffmann & Longhurst, 1999, p. 151).  Reforms have aimed to transform the 
Bundeswehr into a mission-oriented force, resulting in an increasingly diminished role for 
conscripts.  
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Table 2 
Development of conscript ratio since 1991 
Year Active Forces Conscripts 
Percent 
Conscript Year 
Active 
Forces Conscripts 
Percent 
Conscript 
1991 476,300 203,000 42.6 2001 308,400 118,400 38.4 
1992 447,000 201,700 45.1 2002 296,000 107,000 36.1 
1993 408,200 176,300 43.2 2003 284,500 94,500 33.2 
1994 367,300 154,100 42.0 2004 284,500 94,500 33.2 
1995 339,900 137,300 40.4 2005 284,500 94,500 33.2 
1996 358,400 164,550 45.9 2006 284,500 94,500 33.2 
1997 347,100 152,560 44.0 2007 245,702 56,624 23.0 
1998 333,500 137,500 41.2 2008 245,702 56,624 23.0 
1999 332,800 142,000 42.7 2009 244,324 56,624 23.2 
2000 321,000 128,400 40.0 2010 250,613 63,155 25.2 
Note: Data from IISS Military Balance, years 1991 – 2010 
 
 As Table 2 shows, the number of conscripts serving in the Bundeswehr and the 
conscript ratio has decreased significantly since 1991, the result of a series of reforms.  
The Two-Plus-Four Treaty of 1990, which defined the conditions for a reunified 
Germany, set a cap on force strength at 370,000.  The Bundeswehr thus faced the dual 
task of integrating East German soldiers and reducing a combined force size of 620,000 
(Grajetzki, 2010, p. 63).  The conscript ratio did not diminish during this transition, 
remaining between 40 and 45 percent, but fewer conscripts were needed to maintain this 
ratio.  The Defense Policy Guidelines of 1992 further confirmed the centrality of 
conscription to force structure.  Though recognizing the changing role of the armed 
forces in the “post-confrontational era” (paragraph 37) and developing the Bundeswehr’s 
ability to participate in UN missions by creating crisis response forces, the Guidelines 
reiterated the primary objective of the Bundeswehr as territorial defense.  Defense of the 
homeland was defined as the responsibility of every citizen, with the Wehrpflicht serving 
as the glue between the armed forces and society (paragraph 38). 
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 The next reform took effect in 1996 and further reduced troop strength to 
340,000, with a basic military service requirement of 10 months.  Economic rather than 
strategic motives fueled this reform, which worked toward cutting the size and budget of 
the Bundeswehr as a means to cash in on the peace dividend.  Defense Minister Volker 
Rühe (CDU) pledged to save 2.1 billion DM per year while keeping the conscript ratio at 
the status quo (Dyson, 2007, p. 63).  However, increasing participation in out-of-area 
missions, specifically the experience in Kosovo, raised concerns that Germany’s armed 
forces were structurally anachronistic and inept (Huber & Schmidt, 2004, p. 351).  In 
response, Rühe’s successor Rudolf Scharping (SPD) authorized a commission under the 
leadership of former German President Richard von Weizsäcker to make proposals for 
fundamentally transforming the Bundeswehr into a modern force (Dyson, 2007, p. 90).   
The Weizsäcker Commission report (2000) presented a new strategic vision for 
the Bundeswehr, suggesting drastic cuts in troop strength and the conscript ratio with the 
aim of restructuring the armed forces toward the primary objective of participating in out-
of-area crisis missions.  Scharping’s eventual 2003 reform moderated the vision, reducing 
troop strength to 282,000 with 80,000 conscripts serving nine months.  The 
Commission’s rejection of the primacy of territorial defense was further reinforced in the 
Defense Policy Guidelines of 2003, which redefined the Bundeswehr’s role as crisis 
management and highlighted the threat of terrorism (Dyson, 2007, pp. 122-123).  
Scharping’s successor Peter Struck passed a reform to further reduce the number of 
soldiers to 252,000 with around 50,000 conscripts (Klein, 2009, pp. 179-180).   
As the Bundeswehr became smaller and more mobile, fewer and fewer conscripts 
could be structurally tolerated.  The result has been a progressive reduction of basic 
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service time in an attempt to push more conscripts through the system.  The latest 
reduction from nine to six months, the result of a compromise between the Christian-
democratic and Liberal government coalition of Chancellor Merkel, had been in effect 
less than 2 months when Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg announced his 
plans to suspend conscription indefinitely in August 2010 (“Guttenberg will,” 2010; 
“Schwarz-Gelb,” 2010).  The Wehrpflicht, along with the alternative service of 
Zivildienst, will be suspended as of July 1, 2011.  Germany’s last round of conscripts 
reported for duty on January 3 (Repinski, 2011).  Their departure will mark the beginning 
of a new era as the Bundeswehr becomes an all-volunteer force.  
 
Conscription in the European Neighborhood 
The Federal Republic’s remilitarization after the Second World War was 
conceptualized and legitimated through its membership in NATO.  As a consequence, the 
Bundeswehr is deeply embedded within the Alliance structure and European security 
norms.  A full picture of the transformation of the Bundeswehr from a conscript to an all-
volunteer force requires a look at this regional context.  A quick survey of the European 
neighborhood reveals a striking trend toward the development of professional armed 
forces since the end of the Cold War.  Tables 3 and 4 on the following pages provide an 
overview of the force structure, defense expenditures, and force strength for NATO and 
non-NATO European states.   
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Table 3 
NATO member states’ armed forces 
Defense % GDP Active-Duty Forces 
State Structure Reform Date 
Service 
Term 
1990 2009 1990 2010 
Albania Volunteer 2010 - 5.9 2.1 48,000 14,295 
Belgium** Volunteer 1994 - 2.3 1.1 92,000 38,452 
Bulgaria** Volunteer 2008 - 3.7 2.3 129,000 34,975 
Canada Volunteer - - 2.0 1.5 90,000 65,722 
Croatia Volunteer 2010 - - 1.8 - 18,600 
Czech Rep.** Volunteer 2005 - - 1.5 - 17,932 
Denmark** Conscript* - 4-12 mo. 2.0 1.4 31,700 26,585 
Estonia** Conscript - 8-11 mo. - 2.3 - 4,750 
France** Volunteer 2001 - 3.4 2.4 461,250 352,771 
Germany** Volunteer 2011 - 2.5 1.4 469,000 (FRG) 250,613* 
Greece** Conscript - 12 mo. 4.1 4.0 162,500 156,600 
Hungary** Volunteer 2004 - 2.8 1.3 94,000 29,450 
Iceland - - - - - - - 
Italy** Volunteer 2005 - 2.1 1.7 389,600 293,202 
Latvia** Volunteer 2007 - - 2.6 - 5,745 
Lithuania** Volunteer 2009 - - 1.7 - 8,850 
Luxembourg** Volunteer - - 0.8 0.5 800 900 
Netherlands** Volunteer 1996 - 2.5 1.5 102,600 46,882 
Norway Conscript - 12 mo. 2.9 1.5 34,100 24,025 
Poland** Volunteer 2009 - 2.6 2.0 312,800 100,000 
Portugal** Volunteer 2004 - 2.5 2.0 68,000 43,330 
Romania** Volunteer 2006 - 4.5 1.4 163,000 73,350 
Slovakia** Volunteer 2006 - - 1.5 - 16,531 
Slovenia** Volunteer 2003 - - 1.8 - 7,200 
Spain** Volunteer 2002 - 1.7 1.3 274,500 128,013 
Turkey Conscript - 6-15 mo. 3.5 2.8 647,400 510,600 
UK** Volunteer 1963 - 3.9 2.7 306,000 175,690 
USA Volunteer 1973 - 5.3 4.6 2,117,900 1,580,255 
Note. **EU member state 
Note. Denmark only utilizes conscription when the number of volunteers is insufficient.  Conscription in 
Germany will be suspended July 1, 2011, with a planned force reduction to 185,000. 
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Table 4 
Non-NATO European states’ armed forces 
Defense % GDP Active-Duty Forces 
State Structure Reform Date 
Service 
Term 
1990 2009 1990 2010 
Armenia Conscript - 24 mo. - 4.0 - 46,684 
Austria** Conscript - 6 mo. 1.2 0.9 42,500 27,300 
Azerbaijan Conscript - 12-18 mo. - 3.5 - 66,940 
Belarus Conscript - 12-18 mo. - 1.8 - 72,940 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Volunteer 2006 - - 1.5 - 11,099 
Cyprus** Conscript - 25 mo. 7.4 1.8 10,400 10,050 
Finland** Conscript - 6-12 mo. 1.5 1.5 31,000 22,600 
Georgia Conscript - 18 mo. - 5.6 - 21,150 
Ireland** Volunteer - - 1.3 0.6 13,000 10,460 
Macedonia Volunteer 2006 9 mo. - 2.1 - 8,000 
Malta** Volunteer - - - 0.7 1,500 1,954 
Moldova Conscript - 12 mo. - 0.5 - 5,998 
Montenegro Volunteer 2006 - - 1.4 - 3,127 
Russia Conscript - 12 mo. - 4.3 - 1,027,000 
Serbia Conscript* 2011 6 mo. - 2.2 - 29,125 
Sweden** Volunteer 2010 - 2.5 1.3 64,500 13,050 
Switzerland Conscript - 260 days 1.8 0.8 21,500 22,059 
Ukraine Conscript - 12-18 mo. - 2.9 - 129,925 
Note. **EU member state 
Note. Serbia plans to end conscription in 2011. 
Note. Data for Tables 3 and 4 on defense spending from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(2009). Data on active-duty forces from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 
1990 and 2010. Data on force structure, reform date, and service term from The CIA World Fact Book 
(2011) and www.bundeswehr.de. 
 
 Conscription served as a pillar of European security strategy during the Cold War, 
being nearly universally practiced across the divided continent.  Exceptions to this rule 
were the UK, which abolished conscription in 1963, Luxembourg, and the neutral states 
of Ireland and Malta.  Legitimated by the policy of deterrence, conscription existed as the 
most efficient method to recruit the large numbers of troops necessary to guard against a 
possible territorial attack.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of 
the Warsaw Pact, the logic of maintaining large standing armies for the purpose of 
territorial defense fell apart.   
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As shown in Table 3, NATO member states reacted to the disappearance of any 
direct threat on the borders of Europe by cashing in on the peace dividend.  Defense 
budgets were slashed and have remained at depressed levels, most notably in Western 
Europe, where only France, Great Britain, and Greece meet or exceed NATO’s two 
percent defense-spending goal (Germany spent 1.4 percent of GDP on defense in 2009).  
Cuts in spending were accompanied by cuts in force strength, another trend demonstrated 
in Table 3.  These considerations of cost savings fueled what Haltiner and Tresch (2008) 
have defined as the ‘Downsizing’ European military reform wave, which spanned the first 
half of the 1990s (p. 173).  Lacking any clear strategic vision for reform, shrinking 
military budgets created shrinking armies that no longer required the mass mobilization 
of the male population to fill their ranks.  Belgium became the first Allied state to 
respond to these developments by abandoning conscription, transitioning to an all-
volunteer force in 1994.  
 An overabundance of supply was not the only problem that conscription presented 
to European militaries in the new security context – equally important was a shortage of 
skill.  As the Gulf War demonstrated in 1990, conscript armies were not up to the task of 
responding to new security threats.  Whereas Britain’s all-volunteer force deployed 
30,000 soldiers to the Saudi Arabian theater, France could only manage to send 13,000, 
despite having a military nearly double the size of the British (Boëne, 2003, p. 114).  
Where conscripts are not prohibited by law from participating in foreign deployments, 
they are precluded by inadequate training that renders them incompetent to fulfill the 
highly specialized tasks of out-of-area missions.  As Haltiner and Tresch (2008) have 
argued, the increase in out-of-area, multinational missions since 1990 has served as a 
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catalyst for the phasing-out of conscription across the continent.  In a study of 27 
European countries, the authors found a significant negative correlation between 
conscript ratio and participation in out-of-area missions (p. 178).  A new strategic vision 
for European security based on the principles of peacekeeping and crisis management 
provided the impetus for the ‘Professionalization’ reform wave spanning from 1995 to 
2001 (p. 174), during which both the Netherlands and France abandoned the policy of 
conscription.     
 The trend toward smaller, specialized, all-volunteer forces continued during the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, with only the European Allied states of Estonia, 
Greece, Norway, and Turkey holding on to conscription.1   If the picture is expanded to 
look at the larger European neighborhood (Table 4), of non-NATO members of the 
European Union, only Austria, Cyprus, and Finland maintain conscription.  In 
summation: 24 of 28 Allied states and 22 of 27 EU states entrust their security to all-
volunteer rather than conscript forces.  A final look at the states resisting this trend 
reveals a consistent narrative and provides an explanation for why conscription has not 
been phased out completely across Europe.  
 First, the imperative of territorial defense is not anachronistic in those states who 
have persistent territorial disputes with their neighbors, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, Moldavia, Russia, Turkey, and the Ukraine.  This also 
applies to a lesser extent to Estonia, who is still wary of neighboring Russia but may 
choose to follow the lead of its Baltic neighbors Latvia and Lithuania, who transitioned to 
all-volunteer forces in 2007 and 2009 respectively (Haltiner & Tresch, 2008, p. 171).                                                          
1 Denmark officially has conscription, but it is utilized only when volunteers are insufficient to meet force 
strength requirements.  Information can be found at the Danish Defence website: http://forsvaret.dk. 
  14 
Second, states who remained outside of the Cold War alliance system built their 
militaries to deter threats without the assistance of a collective security guarantee.  They 
generally maintain a militia system based on large ratios of reserves and have not faced 
political pressure to end conscription (Jehn & Selden, 2002, p. 96).  This applies to 
Austria, Finland, and Switzerland, though Sweden faced similar conditions and adopted 
an all-volunteer force in 2010.  Lastly, Norway is a unique case.  It is an Alliance 
member, but its force structure resembles the non-aligned states, with an active to reserve 
ratio of 1:8 (Jehn & Selden, 2002, p. 97).  Though these states have chosen to retain 
conscription, they have reduced the share of conscripts serving.  Haltiner and Tresch 
(2008) have calculated that the average proportion of conscripts has dropped from 60 
percent during the Cold War to 26 percent in 2006 (p. 172).  As European militaries 
modernize to adapt to the increasingly complex threat scenarios in the international 
security environment, conscripts are at best degenerating into a second-rate pool of 
reserves, and at worst losing their function altogether (Haltiner & Tresch, 2008, p. 175). 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE WEHRPFLICHT DEBATE 
 
 
 The arguments around the issue of conscription in Germany are well established 
in the literature.  Gareis (2010) has described the debate as one between rivaling 
traditionalist and liberal-progressive camps, both firmly entrenched in their positions and 
selectively citing political, social, and institutional reasons to support their views (p. 27).  
This chapter will provide an overview of the main arguments favored by conscription’s 
supporters and detractors.   
 
Arguments in Favor of Conscription 
 Traditionalists start from the position that security is of primary importance when 
weighing the legitimacy of conscription in a democratic state.  Though the Wehrpflicht 
offers other benefits in a democracy, such an intrusion into the individual lives of citizens 
can only be justified when national security is at stake (Kirsch, 2010, p. 199).  They 
dispute the assertion that the transformed security environment has freed Germany from 
the responsibility of maintaining a robust capacity for territorial defense.  Though a 
territorial attack seems unlikely, a threat could develop over the medium to long-term, 
and the Bundeswehr must be prepared to double the size of its force if required.  
Conscription gives the armed forces the flexibility to respond to unexpected threats 
through increased mobilization (Klein, 2009, pp. 180-181).  Suspending conscription 
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would erase this option, as it could not be reinstated in times of crisis without further 
escalating the conflict (Kirsch, 2010, p. 202).  Furthermore, Germany has a special 
responsibility to provide for peace and security on the European continent, given its 
central geographical location and political weight.  New threats also have a territorial 
dimension that requires the development of contingency plans with “area-covering” 
military measures.  For example, a terrorist attack could threaten infrastructure networks 
across the country or continent.  Conscription provides a ready pool of first-responders 
(Unterseher, 2003, p. 69).  Additionally, conscripts continue to serve a valuable function 
in a modern Bundeswehr that has shifted its focus to out-of-area missions.  Though they 
cannot be deployed abroad, they fill a supportive role at home, taking care of domestic 
duties so that professional soldiers can develop the specialized skills necessary for 
international crisis management (Schmidt, 2010, p. 153).  These territorially bound 
soldiers also play an important role in natural catastrophe response efforts (Kirsch, 2010, 
p. 201).  In short, the end of the Cold War did not spell the end of history.  Security risks 
both old and new threaten all citizens, and conscription remains a legitimate means to 
organize collective defense. 
 Recruitment concerns represent a second traditionalist argument.  Conscription 
provides the armed forces with an essential recruitment pool, without which the 
Bundeswehr would be unable to attract qualified and intelligent career soldiers (Hoffman 
& Longhurst, 1999, p. 160).  Given Germany’s demographic aging, employers face a 
highly competitive labor market where young talent is in high demand and short supply.  
The Bundeswehr’s limited budget places it at a disadvantage, as it must compete with 
private firms who can offer superior monetary incentives and fringe benefits.  
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Additionally, the Bundeswehr must confront a shift in social values, whereby interest in 
serving in the armed forces has declined, especially among the young and educated 
(Tresch, 2008, p. 77).  Under the system of conscription, between 40 and 50 percent of 
career soldiers are recruited during their obligatory military service (Unterseher, 2003, p. 
71; Klein, 2009, p. 182).  A conscript army is the smarter, more modern army.  The 
Wehrpflicht “is the best way to attract the sort of recruits the armed forces are looking 
for: not born warriors drawn to violence but thoughtful folk with varied talents who can 
win over local populations even as they hunt terrorists” (“At ease,” 2010).   
Traditionalists contend that an all-volunteer Bundeswehr would not suffer alone in 
its recruitment woes – the social service sector would also be robbed of Zivildienst, which 
provides 90,000 young men each year for social work in hospitals, homes for the disabled 
and elderly, and kindergartens (Dyson, 2007, p. 22).  Without the pool of affordable labor 
provided by those conscientious objectors who choose to perform social rather than 
military service, the sector would require a significant injection of government spending 
in order to hire professional replacements at higher wages.  The environment of fiscal 
austerity would most likely limit such a social spending plan, leaving the sector 
financially crippled and unable to provide essential services.  Beyond the budgetary 
benefits of Zivildienst, young men acquire a sense of social responsibility during their 
service year and act as positive role models in a field that is traditionally dominated by 
women.  Zivildienst also serves as a bridge in the context of demographic change, 
promoting intergenerational solidarity and understanding (Schroeder, 2010, p. 151). 
Traditionalists also claim that conscription strengthens the democratic character 
of the German Armed Forces, keeping it rooted within civil society and preventing the 
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development of a state-within-a-state (Dyson, 2007, p.34).  The fear of an isolated 
military has its historical roots in the Weimar Republic, where the Reichswehr rose up in 
defiance against a democracy it despised (Klein, 2009, pp. 186-187).  The Wehrpflicht 
reinforces the principle of Citizens in Uniform, whereby soldiers represent a diverse 
spectrum of social backgrounds and political leanings, bring civility to the military 
barracks, and encourage their families back home to take an interest in military affairs 
(Hoffman & Longhurst, 1999, pp. 147-148).  An all-volunteer force oriented toward the 
labor market would result in a decline of social representation, with deprived social 
categories and those with right-wing ideologies being overrepresented.  The result is a 
poor man’s army, alienated from the greater society (Van Doorn, 1975, p. 153). 
 Finally, the Wehrpflicht has for many traditionalists become a symbol of 
Germany’s strategic culture.  The concept of strategic culture challenges the assumption 
that all states act in a uniform, rational manner independent of their specific historical or 
cultural contexts.  Rather, a state approaches security through a historical lens.  As 
Hoffman and Longhurst (1999) have argued, the Wehrpflicht is an integral component of 
a new identity forged after the Second World War, in which the Bundeswehr was to be a 
service for peace and war was rejected as a legitimate tool of foreign policy (pp. 146-
148).  According to former Defense Minister Volker Rühe (CDU), abolishing 
conscription is akin to sanctioning the creation of an intervention army with global power 
projection, a distinct departure from Germany’s strategic culture (as cited in Hoffman & 
Longhurst, 1999, p. 158). 
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Arguments Against Conscription 
 Supporters of an all-volunteer Bundeswehr argue that the end of the Cold War 
transformed the international security environment.  European mass armies and military 
strategies oriented toward territorial defense became anachronistic with the dissolution of 
the Warsaw Pact and removal of any direct territorial threat.  New security threats, 
technological advances in weaponry and equipment, and increasing out-of-area missions 
require less manpower and more brainpower, necessitating a specialization of the armed 
forces and rendering conscripts, with their limited training and skills, ineffective (Van 
Doorn, 1975, p. 150).  Conscripts cannot be deployed abroad, a significant limitation in 
an era where crisis response and conflict management define the Bundeswehr’s main 
tasks.  An outdated force structure has weakened the Bundeswehr’s crisis reaction 
capability and mission performance.  Of a force strength of 250,000, only 6,700 troops 
can be deployed on international missions (“At ease,” 2010).  Additionally, officers must 
be allocated from the intervention and stabilization forces in order to meet the training 
and education demands required by the Wehrpflicht (Klein, 2009, p. 183).  With the 
unfortunate reality that many conscripts will apply this training toward such menial tasks 
as cleaning weaponry and chauffeuring officers, this drain on vital resources cannot be 
strategically justified.  The growing number of European states who have chosen to 
transition to all-volunteer forces demonstrates the growing consensus that the 
conscription model has passed its expiration date. 
 Another critical concern voiced by opponents of the Wehrpflicht is the decline in 
Wehrgerechtigkeit – or the equity of the conscription process.  With the reduction in the 
size of active-duty forces over the past two decades, the Bundeswehr has required less 
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and less conscripts to fill its ranks.  This has changed conscription from a universal to a 
selective system, rendering it unconstitutional (Jehn & Selden, 2002, p. 95).  The 
Ministry of Defense has responded with measures to hide these disturbing statistics, such 
as raising the bar for eligibility.  In 2000, the Bundeswehr declared 10 percent of 
potential conscripts unfit to serve, freeing them from all service obligations.  As reported 
by Der Spiegel (“The army doesn’t want you,” 2011), this number climbed to 42.7 
percent in 2009.  Out of 417,300 young men examined by the Bundeswehr in 2009, 
96,185 remained eligible for military service after subtracting those unfit to serve and 
those who chose to perform an alternative service.  Of this number, 63,413 young men 
were actually required to serve (Froehlingsdorf, Roebel, & Scheuermann, 2010).  A 
conscription system which results in only 15 percent of each age cohort rendering 
military service is not justifiable.     
 Opponents of conscription also claim that an all-volunteer force is the more 
rational economic model.  As Pfaffenzeller (2010) has shown, countries with an all-
volunteer force have on average lower budgetary defense costs as a percentage of GDP 
than countries utilizing conscript systems (p. 490).  The argument that professional 
soldiers cost more and therefore will necessarily drive up personnel costs is based on the 
faulty assumption that a transition to a volunteer-based system would require the same 
personnel strength.  In reality, a professional soldier replaces more than one conscript, in 
terms of training, experience, skills and motivation (Klein, 2009, p. 185).  Furthermore, 
focusing solely on budgetary personnel costs ignores the hidden costs of the conscript 
system.  The cheap manpower provided by the Wehrpflicht promotes an artificially labor-
intensive production process, resulting in an inefficient labor-to-capital ratio 
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(Pfaffenzeller, 2010, p. 484; Poutvaara & Wagener, 2007, p. 7).  Additionally, the total 
cost to society of a draftee is not limited to what the government chooses to pay him, but 
rather includes the value of his lost production elsewhere.  These opportunity costs are 
substantial as conscription ignores the principle of comparative advantage.  In non-
economic terms, not everyone is equally good at being a soldier, and society suffers when 
citizens are forced into this role (Poutvaara & Wagener, 2007, p. 7).  On the individual 
level, draftees are burdened with a sustained break from their own economic 
development, forced to work in the military or social sector instead of investing in their 
human capital through education or work experience.  This results in a lower lifetime 
wage profile for those who must serve (p. 9).  Considering the whole spectrum of costs 
associated with the Wehrpflicht, it proves to be an expensive alternative to the all-
volunteer model.   
 Finally, supporters of transformation consider the link between democracy and 
the Wehrpflicht to be highly dubious.  As Pfaffenzeller (2010) has shown, countries with 
conscription appear on average less democratic than countries with all-volunteer forces, 
based on a comparison using the Freedom House Political Rights index for 2006 (p. 487).  
There is no evidence for a positive mutually conditional relationship between democracy 
and conscription.  Democratic states such as the U.S. and the U.K. have traditionally 
maintained all-volunteer forces, while dictators such as Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini 
started wars with conscription (Klein, 2009, p. 186).  Historically speaking, democracy 
and conscription did not develop simultaneously in Germany, but rather first came 
together after the Second World War (Pfaffenzeller, 2010, p. 488).  Further, the growing 
selectivity of the Wehrpflicht has discredited the claim that a conscript army ensures the 
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equal representation of all social strata in the ranks of the Bundeswehr, strengthening its 
democratic character.  More than half of secondary school graduates reject military 
service and opt for the alternative civilian service (Klein, 2009, p. 181).  The fears of a 
state-within-a-state developing in the absence of the Wehrpflicht are unrealistic.  In 
contrast to the military leadership of the Weimar era, Bundeswehr officers have been 
educated in the democratic state and are loyal to it.  Germany’s unique system of 
parliamentary control over the armed forces acts as an additional safeguard against non-
democratic developments (pp. 186-187).  Reformers reject what they see as boilerplate 
conservative arguments for the Wehrpflicht based on an identity myth born during the 
heights of the Cold War, a myth which should not prevent the Bundeswehr from 
transforming into a modern force.
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
EXPLAINING RESISTANCE TO REFORM 
 
 
 The defensive posture of the traditionalist camp succeeded in keeping 
conscription in Germany for the past two decades, long after most other European states 
had undertaken the transformation to an all-volunteer force.  What makes Germany a 
unique case?  What were the primary factors behind the resilience of the Wehrpflicht 
since 1990?  The public debate in support of conscription has been dominated by the 
normative arguments.  Conscription keeps the armed forces democratic and rooted in 
civil society, fulfils Alliance responsibilities, maintains a strategic culture where soft 
power dominates, and serves as a cornerstone of Germany’s post-war identity.  However, 
the primary factors behind the Wehrpflicht’s staying power are not actually value-based.  
The domestic politics of base closures, military recruitment concerns, and the dependence 
of the social service sector on conscientious objectors served as the main roadblocks to a 
comprehensive reform of the Bundeswehr’s force structure prior to 2010.  
 
Domestic Politics of Base Closures 
In a 2001 interview with Der Spiegel, Richard von Weizsäcker, the chairman of 
the special commission tasked with providing a roadmap for the transformation of the 
Bundeswehr, identified the key obstacle to reform: “Every member of parliament knows 
that no single chapter of reform will attract the attention of his colleagues more than the 
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question of military bases” (Schult, 2001b).  Generally speaking, Bundeswehr reform has 
little pull on the imagination of the German electorate.  According to an October 2006 
poll, only 10 percent of the population shows an active interest in defense matters.  A 
majority of those polled claimed to have little or no interest at all (Institut für 
Demoskopie Allensbach, 2010, p. 325).  However, military bases provide a clear 
exception to this rule.  While seemingly an abstract exercise of military efficiency on 
paper, local populations associate base closures with lost jobs and economic decline 
(Weiland, 2004).  As the most visible and least popular consequence of the structural 
transformation of the Bundeswehr, base closures have embedded the reform process in 
the arena of electoral politics, mobilizing stiff opposition from federal, regional, and local 
politicians.  Conscription has been tightly bound with the domestic politics of base 
closures, as politicians recognize that a professional army would be smaller and demand 
fewer military bases.  Electoral strategy has served as a key factor behind the 
Wehrpflicht’s resilience in the face of military-strategic pressures that favor an all-
volunteer force (Dyson, 2007).  
Since 1990, the two mass political parties have had little to gain and much to lose 
from addressing the issue of conscription.  In constituencies housing military bases, any 
talk of reforming the Bundeswehr into an all-volunteer force could be spun by the 
opposition into a threat to the local economy and used as electoral ammunition.  SPD and 
Union candidates directly compete for these seats and have been averse to politicizing the 
conscription issue.  The smaller parties, such as the Greens and the Liberals, have been 
less constrained in their opposition to conscription, as their candidates are elected from 
state lists and do not have to directly defend a constituency (Dyson, 2007, p. 78).   In 
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contrast to the clear electoral costs of opposing conscription, political gains are diffuse.  
Championing the modernization of the Bundeswehr is unlikely to stir the excitement of 
the base.  In an October 2009 poll conducted by the Bundeswehr Social Science Institute, 
most respondents had little knowledge of current Bundeswehr missions abroad, or had in 
fact never even heard of them (p. 34). 
 The politics of base closures has worked as a brake on Bundeswehr reform over 
the past two decades (Dyson, 2007).  In 1995, Defense Minister Volker Rühe’s (CDU) 
plan to close bases and redirect DM 1.5 billion toward investment met with stiff 
opposition from local politicians and unions.  In response, Rühe modified his ambitions 
and reduced the number of base closures (p. 65).  Similarly, Defense Minister Rudolf 
Scharping’s (SPD) 2001 reform moderated the Weizsäcker Commission’s recommended 
troop reduction in order to keep more bases open (Dyson, 2007, p. 110).  The Chairman 
of the Federal Armed Forces Association commended Scharping for his balanced 
approach (Schult, 2001a).  Still, the political outcry came from every corner.  Paul 
Breuer, Defense Speaker of the Union’s parliamentary group, accused Scharping of 
making indiscriminate cuts in a haphazard fashion.  The Liberal Parliamentary Secretary 
Joerg van Essen criticized the Defense Minister’s arrogant and cold approach 
(“Scharping will,” 2001).  The Director of the Bavarian State Chancellery claimed that 
his state was being used by the SPD as a political punching bag (Schult, 2001a).  7,000 
protestors took to the streets in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, forming a human 
chain in front of a base marked for elimination.  The social-democratic governor publicly 
broke solidarity with his Defense Minister and pledged to keep fighting for the base 
(“10,000 machten,” 2001).  In his own defense, Scharping claimed that from a purely 
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military calculation, 100 additional bases should have been closed (“Scharping will,” 
2001).   
Scharping’s successor to the Defense Ministry Peter Struck (SPD) further reduced 
the size of the Bundeswehr with his 2003 reform and set forth a plan to close 105 bases 
by 2010 (Dyson, 2007, p. 141).  The Federal Armed Forces Association again supported 
the necessity of the base closures, but this did not temper the political firestorm.  
Parliamentary member Veronika Bellman (CDU) likened the economic threat to her 
region of Saxony to a nuclear catastrophe (“Große Unruhe,” 2004).  Governors, including 
social democrats, criticized the closures for ignoring regional economic impacts and 
demanded federal aid for the transition (“Verständnis,” 2004).  Struck rejected these 
appeals and vowed to push through the reform despite political resistance.  He defended 
his decision to preserve the Wehrpflicht, arguing that its abolition would require the 
closure of an additional 60 bases (“Struck kontert,” 2004). 
  As the above survey of political rhetoric surrounding base closures reveals, the 
growing strategic irrelevance of conscripts did not stop politicians from fighting for the 
preservation of the Wehrpflicht.  Conscription has been a stopgap on force downsizing, 
preventing base closures that could hurt politicians representing the targeted regions at 
the ballot box.  However, as a recent study by Paloyo, Vance, and Vorell (2010) has 
shown, the assumption that communities facing base closures will suffer economic 
decline is not supported by the data.  The authors found no significant impact of base 
closures on key socioeconomic indicators such as unemployment, household income, 
regional output, or tax revenue (p. 6).  Bundeswehr bases are less integrated into the local 
economy than realized: they are small, self-sufficient, and autonomously administered.  
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The majority of provisions are not procured locally, but from a central location in 
Oldenburg, Niedersachsen.  Most soldiers commute rather than settling their families in 
the area.  The study suggested that base closures may in fact have a positive impact on 
the local economy, offering prime real estate for civilian development projects (pp. 12-
13).  However, election cycles are short, and politicians who promise growth at some 
unknown point in the future following a painful adjustment process are unlikely to 
emerge victorious.  Abstract future gains do not trump tangible and immediate losses in 
the political game.  In a strategic effort to save local jobs, and their jobs, politicians 
fought to keep their bases manned and open, a primary factor behind the political non-
debate over conscription. 
 
Recruitment 
 While politicians feared the electoral consequences of transitioning to an all-
volunteer force, leading voices within the Ministry of Defense and military leadership 
argued that abandoning the Wehrpflicht would be a “fatal” mistake, cutting off the 
recruitment leg of the Bundeswehr (Hengst & Meiritz, 2009).  General Harald Kujat, 
Bundeswehr Chief of Staff between 2000 and 2002, claimed that eliminating the pool of 
conscripts would render the armed forces incapable of fulfilling their international 
responsibilities (“Bundeswehr nur beschränkt,” 2001).   As previously mentioned, nearly 
half of professional soldiers begin as conscripts (Unterseher, 2003, p. 71; Klein, 2009, p. 
182).   
The Defense Ministry looked to European states who had made the transition to 
an all-volunteer force and was not comforted by the results.  After France ended 
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conscription in 2001, it saw a rise in personnel costs from 30 to 37 percent of the defense 
budget, despite starkly reducing the total force strength.  Likewise, Belgium saw 
personnel costs rise from 50 to 58 percent after the 1994 transition.  Spain saw an 
increase from 41 to 50 percent (Buch, 2010b, p. 10).  Rising personnel costs prevented 
these armed forces from realizing a major aim of the modernizing reforms, namely to 
increase investment.  In fact, France, Belgium, and Spain all saw decreases in the 
investment share of their defense budgets (Buch, 2010b, p. 11).  According to a 2005 
internal study conducted by the Ministry of Defense, professionalizing the Bundeswehr 
without a force reduction would potentially raise personnel costs by €7.2 billion per year.  
Though the study admitted that accurately predicting the costs of an all-volunteer force 
was a challenge, it stressed the fact that all of Germany’s neighbors who had transitioned 
away from conscription had underestimated the resulting rise in personnel costs (Ilse, 
2005). 
In addition to the suspension of the Wehrpflicht resulting in a potential rise in 
personnel costs, defense experts also feared a downward spiral in terms of recruit quality 
(Ilse, 2005).  In this respect, Spain serves as a valuable example.  Attracting voluntary 
recruits has proven to be a real problem, with the result that standards have had to be 
downgraded.  The recruitment age was raised, physical fitness requirements lowered, and 
a satisfactory intelligence test score reduced to below the population average.  Seven 
percent of the Spanish Armed Forces must be pulled from the immigrant population.  
Despite these measures, Spain has not been able to achieve force strength targets (Buch, 
2010b, pp. 11-12).  
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A professional Bundeswehr would likely also suffer from a dearth of qualified 
volunteers, and supporters of the Wehrpflicht have argued that its suspension would result 
in the development of a “redneck army” (U. Winkelmann, personal communication, 
January 28, 2011).  According to General Hartmut Bagger, Bundeswehr Chief of Staff 
between 1996 and 1999, conscription raises the level of professionalism in the armed 
forces.  In a 1996 editorial written for FOCUS Magazin, Bagger argued that Germany 
should not follow the trend of its European neighbors and adopt a “professional” army, as 
the Wehrpflicht provided the Bundeswehr with clear advantages over an all-volunteer 
force.  Conscription makes available the full potential of the next generation for military 
service, resulting in a more intelligent and balanced army.   A conscript force is younger 
and has more vitality: the average age of a German soldier is 26 years – 12 years younger 
than the average found in all-volunteer forces.  In contrast, professional armies are 
relegated to recruiting from the economically and socially disadvantaged segments of 
society, which has a negative impact on the quality and culture of the armed forces 
(Bagger, 1996).   
According to Kirsch (as cited in Birnbaum, 2010), the Bundeswehr faced little 
chance of competing with private firms for the “brightest minds and most skilled hands” 
in the absence of the Wehrpflicht.  Large companies such as BMW and BASF, as well as 
competitive small and medium-sized firms, offered a flexibility that the large apparatus 
of the Bundeswehr could not match.  Furthermore, the Bundeswehr potentially faced a 
higher hurdle than many of its neighbors in making itself an attractive employer.  For 
much of the educated population, a career in the military is not desirable for largely 
historical reasons.  In a 2008 study conducted by the Bundeswehr Social Science 
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Institute, the armed services ranked in 22nd place in a list of employers selected by young 
men as most desirable (p. 130).  Fifty-five percent of male participants could never 
imagine a career with the Bundeswehr, increasing to 63 percent when limited to those 
who had obtained the qualifications for university entrance (p. 142).  The effort to create 
a new German identity after the Second World War has resulted in a demilitarized social 
consciousness, to the detriment of the Bundeswehr.  In other words, the reeducation has 
been too successful (T. Wiegold, personal communication, January 24, 2011).  An all-
volunteer force would require a strong marketing campaign and increased financial 
incentives, further adding to costs of recruitment without guaranteeing successful results. 
 
Social Service Sector 
The perceived electoral consequences of base closures and military recruitment 
concerns worked together with a third factor to buttress the Wehrpflicht against the 
growing pressures for reform since 1990: the dependence of the social service sector on 
the cheap labor of conscientious objectors.  Much of the public debate in Germany over 
conscription has focused on the social rather than the military dimension of reform.  
Germany’s Basic Law establishes the right of conscientious objection and provides the 
legal basis for Zivildienst as the alternative social service to the Wehrpflicht (GG, §12a).  
Consequently, the end of the Wehrpflicht also means the end of Zivildienst.  As argued in 
a 1990 cover story by Der Spiegel (“Dann machen”), conscientious objectors had become 
an “irreplaceable stopgap” for Germany’s beleaguered social service sector.  While fewer 
soldiers in the barracks concerned almost no one, a decline in the number of available 
conscientious objectors threatened the German care system with total collapse.        
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The development of this dependency can be traced back to 1984, when a new law 
abolished the oral examination requirement for avoiding military service.  The de facto 
ability for young men to choose between military or social service resulted in growing 
numbers of conscientious objectors.  The Federal Office for Civilian Service responded 
by increasing the number of positions open to the so-called “Zivis” (“Dann machen,” 
1990).  Table 5 shows the development in the number of conscientious objectors vis-à-vis 
conscripts between 1984 and 2009, as well as the number of available Zivildienst 
positions.   
Table 5 
Zivildienst: Developments vis-à-vis Military Service since 1984 
Year 
Recruited 
for Civil 
Service 
Recruited 
for Mil. 
Service 
Ratio 
Civ : 
Mil 
Civil 
Service 
Positions 
Year 
Recruited 
for Civil 
Service 
Recruited 
for Mil. 
Service 
Ratio 
Civ : 
Mil 
Civil 
Service 
Positions 
1984 32,550 204,415 1:6.3 60,423 1997 130,108 159,639 1:1.2 181,035 
1985 39,280 188,739 1:4.8 69,066 1998 129,148 160,435 1:1.2 183,580 
1986 45,512 199,394 1:4.4 78,522 1999 129,667 154,842 1:1.2 187,223 
1987 48,886 184,638 1:3.8 88,397 2000 124,888 144,647 1:1.2 190,222 
1988 52,587 192,614 1:3.7 98,416 2001 130,248 129,441 1:1 192,222 
1989 61,938 173,184 1:2.8 111,474 2002 136,008 123,812 1.1:1 188,449 
1990 94,731 188,697 1:2 120,735 2003 105,484 102,600 1:1 159,067 
1991 74,450 210,981 1:2.8 124,323 2004 91,346 79,850 1.1:1 150,793 
1992 89,410 202,449 1:2.3 158,263 2005 83,436 68,428 1.2:1 138,179 
1993 102,268 160,611 1:1.6 165,969 2006 82,966 71,321 1.2:1 122,186 
1994 106,050 156,964 1:1.5 166,875 2007 84,225 67,823 1.2:1 114,872 
1995 110,976 167,450 1:1.5 171,819 2008 85,149 68,270 1.2:1 111,450 
1996 127,203 169,730 1:1.3 177,343 2009 90,555 68,304 1.3:1 111,499 
Note. Data on military and civil service recruitment from Spiegel Online, Gesamtzahl der Einberufungen 
zum Zivildienst und zum Grundwehrdienst pro Jahr [Graphic]. Reflects total number of men called to 
service during the year and does not indicate the number of men in service at any one point in time. 
Note. Data on civil service positions from Bundesamt für den Zivildienst (2011). Indicates total number of 
available positions, both open and filled. 
 
Two trends are clear from the data presented in Table 5.  First, the number of 
conscientious objectors has grown significantly since 1984, increasing every year until 
2002 and surpassing the number of military conscripts since 2001.  Second, the number 
of available positions for conscientious objectors tripled between 1984 and 2001, 
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reaching a peak of 192,222 before subsequent reductions.  Although Zivildienst is legally 
limited by the principle of labor market neutrality, which means that conscientious 
objectors cannot be used to replace existing positions or prevent the creation of new job 
openings, employers often ignored these limitations and saddled the young men with 
responsibilities beyond their qualifications (Deggerich, 2004).  The resulting system 
preserved an artificially low level of full-time professionals in favor of a functional 
dependence on Zivildienst (“Dann machen,” 1990).   
This social dimension of Bundeswehr policy increased the perceived electoral 
consequences of suspending the draft.  As Dyson (2007) has argued, political leaders 
wished to avoid the question of how the social service sector would transition away from 
Zivildienst.  They feared committing to higher social spending, a likely consequence of 
replacing the cheap labor of conscientious objectors with professionals at market value.  
For example, in the run-up to the 1998 federal elections, SPD strategists concluded that 
abolishing conscription would be a vote loser.  An internal discussion paper found that 
the end of Zivildienst would both increase costs and reduce the quality of services 
provided to society’s most vulnerable (Dyson, 2007, p. 77).  SPD leadership was 
particularly affected by what Dyson (2007) has called the ‘mobilization of bias’ (p. 96) 
within the social policy sphere, which worked to prevent an open discussion on reforming 
conscription in order to preserve Zivildienst.  As the self-proclaimed party of social 
solidarity, the SPD again avoided the issue before the 2002 federal elections (p. 97).  
Thus the social service sector’s direct benefit from the existing “military-civil service 
complex” worked to preserve conscription despite military-strategic arguments that 
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favored an all-volunteer force (U. Winkelmann, personal communication, January 28, 
2011). 
It is important to note that resistance from within the social service sector to 
reform has diminished significantly in recent years.  Similar to the Wehrpflicht, the length 
of Zivildienst has been progressively reduced since 1990 from 20 months to 6 months.  
As a result, conscientious objectors can no longer perform advanced tasks due to 
inadequate training and service time.  In response, most service providers have reduced 
their numbers of employed conscientious objectors and transitioned to a more stable 
staffing model (Deggerich, 2004).  As described in a July 2010 report by the Center for 
Conscientious Objectors (Zentralstelle-KDV), the end of Zivildienst would in no way lead 
to a social catastrophe.  The social service sector presently employs 3.5 million people, 
only 1 percent of whom are providing Zivildienst (p. 4).  Table 5 captures this 
development, showing a 42 percent reduction in the number of positions open to 
conscientious objectors between 2001 and 2009.  Thus, the Zivildienst factor has lost 
much of its factual basis over the past decade, though it has remained prominent in the 
public debate.   
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
EXPLAINING THE REFORM’S SUCCESS 
 
 
Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg’s plan to shrink the Bundeswehr and transform it 
into an all-volunteer force initially met with stiff resistance in the summer of 2010, 
especially from within his own Christian-democratic party (“Zoff um Wehrpflicht,” 
2010).  The factors which had precluded such a fundamental reform in the past remained.  
Zu Guttenberg’s recommended force size of 165,0002 would close the doors on a large 
number of military bases, and the suspension of conscription would challenge the 
Bundeswehr and the civilian service sector to attract professionals on the competitive 
labor market.  Old, familiar themes dominated the political debate, with the Wehrpflicht 
defended as a central pillar of the Union’s platform and a symbol of Germany’s post-war 
identity (Fischer, 2010).  Then, suddenly, political resistance crumbled.  The Christian-
democratic parties lined up behind the reform, and in December 2010 the government 
coalition agreed to an all-volunteer Bundeswehr of 185,000.  July 1, 2011 will mark the 
end of conscription in Germany (“Bundeswehrreform,” 2010).   
Following two decades of piecemeal reform and paralyzed debate, zu Guttenberg 
achieved a fundamental transformation of the Bundeswehr within a few short months.  
Three primary factors enabled this success: changing economic conditions, the growing                                                         
2 General Volker Wieker, Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, presented five alternative structural models to 
the Cabinet in a June 2010 report, both including and excluding conscript elements. Zu Guttenberg 
advocated model 4.  The full report can be accessed at www.bmvg.de (Bericht des Generalinspekteurs der 
Bundeswehr zum Prüfauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur vom 7. Juni 2010). 
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problem of inequity in the conscription selection system, and zu Guttenberg’s immense 
popularity.   
 
Financial Realities 
 The global financial crisis and fears of a Eurozone collapse created the economic 
conditions necessary for zu Guttenberg to argue that the status quo was no longer 
sustainable.  The Bundeswehr reform agenda benefitted from a political climate of 
urgency or even panic, as European leaders took bold steps to slow the recession.  After 
taking part in a series of emergency bailouts for embattled states and a €750 billion bid to 
stabilize the Euro, Germany positioned itself as an example of fiscal responsibility 
(“Sondersitzung,” 2010).  In the context of a historic austerity package passed in June 
2010 with the aim of saving €80 billion by 2014, the Ministry of Defense was asked to 
contribute to the effort with cuts totaling €8.3 billion over four years (Marsh, 2011).  Zu 
Guttenberg presented his structural reform as the only viable option to meet the savings 
goal (U. Winkelmann, personal communication, January 28, 2011).   
Conscripts cost the Bundeswehr €400 million each year, a personnel investment 
with low returns in light of their limited skills and deployability.  In addition, 
conscription employs between 10,000 and 20,000 professional soldiers with training and 
organizational tasks (“At ease,” 2010).  Zu Guttenberg argued that the financial austerity 
measures required a significant cut to force size, with the suspension of conscription as 
the least complicated and most effective method to this end (T. Wiegold, personal 
communication, January 24, 2011).  Ending conscription would quickly remove 55,000 
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soldiers from the equation and allow the professional soldiers tasked with supporting the 
Wehrpflicht system to be used more effectively (Wieker, 2010, p. 55). 
Zu Guttenberg was heavily criticized for framing the reform as a response to the 
budget crunch and stepped back from his initial economic argument, choosing to stress 
the security dimension behind the transformation to a smaller, more mobile all-volunteer 
force.  His argumentation included all of the talking points of the liberal-progressive side 
of the debate: a transformation of the international security environment, an increase in 
the complexity of technology and mission parameters, the geographic and training 
limitations of conscripts, and the need to increase the Bundeswehr’s deployability and 
competencies in out-of-area missions.  Though this strategic argument is very strong, it 
had never alone been sufficient to disturb the political comfort of maintaining the status 
quo.  The economic crisis and subsequent austerity measures removed the option of 
staying the course and maintaining present troop levels, opening a window for 
fundamental reform.  In zu Guttenberg’s words: “We needed a loud wake-up call to 
prove the need for reform.  If we had just had a political debate about security, I am not 
sure how much the future of the Bundeswehr would have been discussed beyond expert 
groups” (Marsh, 2011).     
The economic case for a smaller Bundeswehr is clear.  More questionable from a 
purely budgetary standpoint is the preference for professional over conscript soldiers.  A 
professional soldier costs upward of three-times the amount of a conscript per year 
(Unterseher, 2003, p. 65).  As discussed previously, neighboring states who had already 
made the transition to all-volunteer forces were unable to avoid rising personnel costs as 
a consequence.  As the strategic argument in favor of an all-volunteer force has remained 
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relatively static, its explanatory powers for the rapid success of the reform are limited.  
More decisive in this case is the question of Wehrgerechtigkeit, or the equity of the draft.  
The justice of the conscription system is directly related to the size of the armed forces, 
as downsizing requires fewer men to serve.  If downsizing continues past a certain point, 
conscription can no longer be legitimated.  As explained in the next section, the 
Bundeswehr had reached this point. 
 
Wehrgerechtigkeit 
 The increasing misfit between the supply and demand of young men for basic 
military service played a decisive role in the decision to abandon the Wehrpflicht in 
Germany.  As stipulated by Article 12 of the German Basic Law, “No person may be 
required to perform work of a particular kind except within the framework of a traditional 
duty of community service that applies generally and equally to all.”  Article 12a further 
defines conscription or an alternative service as one such traditional duty for young men 
upon reaching the age of 18.  A pressing concern for the government from a 
constitutional perspective was an increasing sense of arbitrariness in the conscript 
selection process.  The decline in demand for conscripts was a consequence of a 
shrinking Bundeswehr, further intensified by a decreasing conscript to volunteer ratio.  
What developed was a de facto selective conscription system that potentially violated the 
constitutional requirement for Wehrgerechtigkeit, placing the burden of service on an 
ever-smaller percentage of eligible young men (Trenkamp & Wiemann. 2009). 
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Table 6 
Overview of Wehrgerechtigkeit, 2009 
Birth Year Cohort Size Unfit to Serve Percent Unfit to Serve Conscripted 
Percent 
Conscripted 
1982 445,564 109,947 24.7 97,928 22.0 
1983 437,465 118,173 27.0 81,821 18.7 
1984 435,898 128,314 29.4 72,977 16.7 
1985 436,412 144,551 33.1 67,227 15.4 
1986 451,151 185,685 41.2 67,509 15.0 
Note. Data from Bundesregierung answer to German Bundestag, Drucksache 17/1281, March 30, 2010 
Note. These numbers are final in so far as men are ineligible to be drafted after the age of 23. 1986 is the 
last age cohort to qualify. 
 
 Table 6 above illustrates the increasing inequity in the conscription selection 
process across five male cohorts.  One striking trend is the increasing percentage of males 
found unfit to serve and thus freed from any service obligation.  This number increased 
from 24.7 percent of the 1982 cohort to 41.2 percent of the 1986 cohort.  The expansion 
of qualification requirements reflected a clear political strategy (Flohr & Popp, 2007).  As 
the courts had interpreted the measure of draft inequity as the percentage of men fit to 
serve but not drafted, a policy which raised the bar for qualification had the effect of 
distorting the statistics to make the conscription process seem more legitimate.  A truer 
indicator of the justice of the draft is the percent of men from each cohort who actually 
fulfilled the obligation of military service.  This number decreased from 22 percent of the 
1982 cohort to 15 percent of the 1986 cohort.   
In 1999 the District Court of Potsdam ruled in favor of defendant Volker 
Wiedersberg, who had refused to render either military or civilian service.  The court 
suspended the legal action against Wiedersberg, ruling that the Wehrpflicht was no longer 
a legitimate infringement on an individual’s fundamental rights given the changed 
geopolitical environment (“Ex-Verteidigungsminister,” 1999).  In a landmark 2002 
judgment, the Federal Constitutional Court rejected the lower court’s request for a 
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constitutional review of the Wehrpflicht, ruling that decisions of national military defense 
were “issues of political prudence and economic expediency” and could not “be reduced 
to a constitutional question” (Federal Ministry of Defense, 2002, p. 32).  The court’s 
decision that it had no jurisdiction in questions of geopolitical calculus was a clear 
victory for the government, but the question of draft equity remained highly contested 
and open to legal challenges. 
In 2004 the District Administrative Court of Cologne ruled that conscription no 
longer upheld the principle of Wehrgerechtigkeit.  This decision was appealed by the 
government and overturned by the Federal Administrative Court in Leipzig, which as 
previously mentioned, interpreted draft equity with a calculation including only those 
men deemed fit for military service but not drafted (“Wehrgerechtigkeit gewahrt,” 2005).  
In 2008 the District Administrative Court in Cologne again ruled in favor of a plaintiff 
who complained that the Wehrpflicht violated the constitutional principle of 
Wehrgerechtigkeit and referred the case to the Federal Constitutional Court.  The court 
rejected the case, arguing that the lower court had not provided sufficient evidence for its 
ruling.  The media interpreted the court’s refusal to review the case as a clear reluctance 
to decide the fate of such a politically loaded issue (Titz & Leffers, 2009).  However, it is 
unlikely that the Federal Constitutional Court could have avoided ruling on the equity of 
the Wehrpflicht in the long-term.  In an interview with Bild am Sonntag in August 2010, 
zu Guttenberg stated that the Bundeswehr was already a de facto all-volunteer force, 
warning that the Wehrpflicht would not survive a legal challenge in front of the 
Constitutional Court (Backhaus & Eichinger, 2010).  A legal ruling against the 
constitutionality of the Wehrpflicht would be an embarrassment to the government and 
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the Bundeswehr.  Zu Guttenberg wanted to preempt this situation, recognizing that if 
conscription could not be sustained, the transition to an all-volunteer force would be more 
successful and enjoy greater legitimacy as part of a politically negotiated military reform. 
 
 
The zu Guttenberg Factor 
 To summarize the points made so far, conscription in Germany continued to exist 
as an essentially closed system after 1990, despite the fundamental transformation of the 
international security environment in which it was embedded.  Previous Bundeswehr 
reforms did not have a deep impact on the model, aiming only for minimal adaptation by 
making small adjustments in the length of service time or the conscript ratio.  Internally, 
the system suffered from a structural weakness: the inverse relationship between equity 
and force size.  As the Bundeswehr diminished in number, the structure of the model 
became increasingly unstable.  The external shock of the financial crisis and subsequent 
austerity measures further destabilized the system.  A final factor, quantitatively difficult 
to capture but nevertheless essential to explain how such an entrenched policy was 
reformed out of existence, is the quality of the man behind the reform: previous Minister 
of Defense Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg.  His ability to communicate the need for change 
and attract popular attention to the reform of a traditionally unsexy ministry acted as a 
final catalyst in the push to modernize the Bundeswehr into an all-volunteer force.   
 Zu Guttenberg consistently ranked as the most popular politician in Germany 
during his time in office.  According to a February 2011 ARD-DeutschlandTREND poll, 
which asked respondents about their level of satisfaction with leading politicians, zu 
Guttenberg scored highest with 68 percent. Similarly, the ZDF Politbarometer showed zu 
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Guttenberg to be Germany’s most beloved politician since he took over the Ministry of 
Defense in October 2009.  This is an astonishing fact given the acknowledged “friendly 
disinterest” in security policy in Germany (Köhler, 2005).  If one has ambitions for a 
political career, a general rule is to keep away from the Ministry of Defense.  Journalists 
rarely report on military issues, politicians do not debate them, and the public does not 
care to listen (C. Thiels, personal communication, January 31, 2011).  In contrast to his 
predecessors, zu Guttenberg had the charisma factor.  He exuded a young, modern, and 
transatlantic attitude.  As described by a former defense correspondent who traveled with 
the Minister, his self-esteem seemed to come through every pore (U. Winkelmann, 
personal communication, January 28, 2011).  When he spoke, he electrified the room.  In 
short, zu Guttenberg was just the type of political animal needed to shake the Union into 
abandoning such a symbolically loaded policy as the Wehrpflicht.  
 Zu Guttenberg’s resignation from office on March 1, 2011 following allegations 
that he plagiarized sections of his doctoral thesis may result in renewed political debate 
over the feasibility and implementation of the planned Bundeswehr reforms, but his 
popularity has not suffered as a consequence.  In fact, he has emerged from the scandal 
more popular than before.  In a March 2011 ARD-DeutschlandTREND poll, 73 percent of 
respondents expressed satisfaction with his performance.  Zu Guttenberg’s uncanny 
ability to attract attention and shape public opinion in an era dominated by information 
overload will be sorely missed by his party and Bundeswehr advocates. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Following two decades of gridlocked debate, the Bundeswehr has made the 
transition to an all-volunteer force under the policy leadership of former Minister of 
Defense Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg.  In the context of the general European trend 
toward abandoning conscription since the end of the Cold War, this development seems 
inevitable in hindsight.  However, the reform faced serious roadblocks.  Electoral politics 
mobilized stiff opposition from federal, regional, and local politicians, who saw military 
base closures as jeopardizing their political ambitions.  The Ministry of Defense and 
military leadership believed that an all-volunteer Bundeswehr would be incapable of 
recruiting professional soldiers from the competitive labor market.  Finally, Zivildienst 
had developed into a pillar of the social service sector, and politicians wished to avoid the 
financial and social consequences of its suspension.  
 Three developments converged to question the sustainability of the status quo and 
allow for the suspension of conscription in Germany.  First, the unprecedented financial 
crisis and near collapse of the Eurozone demanded decisive action from the government, 
who responded with a strict austerity package.  A Bundeswehr of 250,000 was no longer 
a financial possibility.  Second, rising concerns of injustice in the conscript selection 
system, whereby only 15 percent of a cohort reported to the barracks, threatened to send 
the issue of the Wehrpflicht in front of the Constitutional Court.  Third, zu Guttenberg’s 
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extreme popularity gave him the legitimacy and political power to finally push through 
transformational structural reform. 
 The aim of this thesis was limited in scope, providing a general understanding of 
the forces and faces behind Germany’s delayed transition to an all-volunteer force.  An 
interesting question now arises.  How will Germany choose to use its new Bundeswehr?  
Chancellor Merkel has heralded the reform as a symbol of Germany’s readiness to 
change.  But change into what?  The suspension of conscription may be the next step in a 
larger security strategy development, in which Germany will claim a greater stake in the 
international security infrastructure and adopt a “normalized” posture toward the use of 
force.  Conversely, the financial necessity of the reform could be a signal that Germany 
will continue to slash its defense budget and further retreat into an already markedly 
force-adverse culture after its departure from Afghanistan. 
 Based on Germany’s policy of multilateral integration and its increasing 
participation in out-of-area missions, the first hypothesis is more likely.  An interesting 
development that deserves further research is defense synergy on the European level.  
Europe spends about the same on defense as the U.S., but it doesn’t get the same power 
(C. Thiels, personal communication, January 31, 2011).  Each state uses its own assault 
rifle and its own type of ammunition.  As all EU states are under pressure in regards to 
their defense budgets, it makes sense to pool resources and capabilities on a supranational 
level (U. Winkelmann, personal communication, January 28, 2011).  Germany’s 
increasing participation in this process is especially interesting, as strict Parliamentary 
control over mission parameters presents a sizeable problem for a common European 
defense strategy.  
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